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I. INTRODUCTION
This case note will discuss the United States Supreme Court's analysis
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,' a recent case in which the Court held that the
application of a state's public accommodations law that required the Boy Scouts
to retain an avowed homosexual in a leadership position violated the Boy
1 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
1
Stringer: Has the Supreme Court Created a Constitutional Shield for Private
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2001
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Scouts's First Amendment right of expressive association.2 The Court noted
that, generally, states have the power to enact public accommodations laws
when the legislature "has reason to believe that a given group is the target of
discrimination.' '3 However, these laws may not impose any "serious burden" on
an organization's right of expressive association.4 Relying primarily upon the
First Amendment analytical framework applied in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. ,5 the Court determined that
Dale's position as an Assistant Scoutmaster would significantly "interfere with
the Boy Scout's [sic] choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its be-
liefs."'6 In so holding, the majority applied a balancing test, with the state's in-
terest in eliminating discrimination on one side of the scale, and the Boy
Scouts's associational interest in freedom of expression on the other.7 In this
case, the Court refused to find that eliminating the effects of invidious discrimi-
nation against homosexuals was a compelling state interest.8 Therefore, because
New Jersey's public accommodations law did not address a compelling state
interest, the Court found that the law unduly burdened the Boy Scouts's consti-
tutional freedom of expressive association; that is, the Boy Scouts's interest in
excluding homosexuals from its organization outweighed the state's interest in
protecting that class of citizens from discrimination. 9
This note addresses the significance of Dale in the evolving area of
freedom of association jurisprudence. Part II defines state public accommoda-
tions laws and examines the scope of the state law at issue in Dale. Next, Part 1H
examines the parameters of the First Amendment freedom of association. Part
IV critiques the Court's opinion in Dale, particularly its application of Roberts
v. United States Jaycees' and its reliance on Hurley. Part 1V also includes a
thorough examination of Justice Stevens's forceful dissent in Dale. Part V con-
siders the precedential implications of Dale on the constitutional freedom of
association and the applicability and scope of state public accommodations
laws, as well as Dale's effect on progressive social policies. Finally, Part VI
concludes that Dale's future viability may be in jeopardy and that, in fact, Dale
must and will be challenged in order to further society's interest in the "eradica-
2 See id.
3 Id. at 658 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)).
4 Id.
5 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
6 Dale, 530 U.S. at 654.
7 See id. at 658-59.
8 See id. at 659.
9 See id.
10 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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tion of 'the cancer of discrimination.""'
II. STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
Most every state has a statute prohibiting places of public accommoda-
tion' 2 from discriminating on specified bases, most commonly including race,
religion, color, age, and sex. 13 At issue in Dale was New Jersey's public ac-
commodations statute, the Law Against Discrimination (hereinafter "LAD"),
which went beyond the traditional scope of such statutes when, in 1991, it was
amended to include "affectional or sexual orientation."'14 The New Jersey Legis-
lature passed the amendment after determining that practices of discrimination
"are matters of concern to the government of the State" because "such discrimi-
nation threatens ...the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the
State," and that "people suffer personal hardships, and the State suffers a griev-
ous harm."'15 New Jersey "prides itself on judging each individual by his or her
merits," and on being "in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of




The Boy Scouts of America (hereinafter "BSA") has faced numerous
court challenges to its exclusionary membership policies under state public ac-
commodations laws. Through these challenges, brought on behalf of girls, athe-
ists, and homosexuals, four state supreme courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit have held that BSA is not a place of public accommoda-
tion. 17 In a groundbreaking decision, however, the Supreme Court of New Jer-
11 Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 253
A.2d 793, 799 (N.J. 1969)).
12 A "public accommodation" is generally a business establishment which is open to the
public and provides lodging, food, entertainment, recreation, or other services. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 995 (7th ed. 1999).
13 Thomas E. Baker, Can a State Require the Boy Scouts to Appoint an Assistant Scoutmas-
ter Who Is Gay?, 1999-2000 PREVIEW U.S. SuP. CT. CAS. 360, 361. West Virginia, for exam-
ple, prohibits a place of public accommodation from discriminating because of "race, religion,
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or disability." W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(6)
(2001). Public accommodations laws are, therefore, the functional equivalent of anti-
discrimination or civil rights statutes.
14 The LAD provides: "All persons shall have the opportunity to ... obtain all the accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation ...
without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex ...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4
(West 2000).
15 Id. § 10:5-3.
16 Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978).
17 See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993), afjfg 787 F. Supp. 1511
(N.D. Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1012 (1993); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts
of Am., 952 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1998); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm'n on
2001]
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sey departed from these decisions in unanimously holding that BSA does fall
within the scope of New Jersey's LAD.' 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court
first remarked that because the LAD was remedial in nature, it should be liber-
ally construed to effectuate its purpose and objectives. 9 Next, the court rea-
soned that "the statutory noun 'place' ... is a term of convenience, not of limita-
tion, ' 20 because "places do not discriminate; people who own and operate places
do.,,21 Then, the court held that BSA was a "public accommodation" because it
"engages in broad public solicitation .... maintains close relationships with the
government ... [and] is similar to enumerated or other previously recognized
public accommodations. 22 Despite the importance of this aspect of the holding,
however, there is a second aspect of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's holding
that is even more significant-that applying the LAD to the Boy Scouts in order
to require the group to retain a homosexual member did not violate BSA's First
Amendment freedom of association.23
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The First Amendment does not explicitly mention the right of associa-
tion; however, the Supreme Court has long inferred the right to associate with
other individuals "as being a necessary corollary of the rights that are mentioned
in the text."24 Freedom of association was first recognized in the 1958 case of
Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Seabourn v. Coronado Area
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551
P.2d 465 (Or. 1976).
18 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
19 Id. at 1208, 1217.
20 Id. at 1209 (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33,
37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)).
21 Id. at 1210 (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 279 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998) (quoting Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1282 (Cummings, C.J., dissenting))), aff'd, 734 A.2d
1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Here, the court noted that other jurisdictions had
interpreted the term "place" to be "a limiting factor encompassing only a fixed location." Id. at
1209. The New Jersey Supreme Court departed from these decisions because it recognized that
some public accommodations, such as Little League and the Boy Scouts, are provided at "a
moving situs." Id. at 1210 (quoting Little League, 318 A.2d at 37).
22 Id. at 1210. This decision affirmed the superior court's holding, which was based on the
following factors: the "BSA invites the public at large" and is "dependent upon the broad-based
participation of members of the general public," it "engages in [nationwide] advertising and
public promotion," it shares "many attributes in common" with the places enumerated in the
LAD, and it has a "historic partnership with various public entities and public service organiza-
tions." Dale, 706 A.2d at 280-82 (citations omitted).
23 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1222-23, 1225.
24 Baker, supra note 13, at 362.
[Vol. 104
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NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,25 in which the Supreme Court commented
on the "close nexus between freedoms of speech and assembly" and declared
that the "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech., 26 A later
decision reaffirmed the Patterson holding, stating that "implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right
to associate with others.'
The Court has analyzed the freedom of association in two distinct con-
texts. "In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate htman relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State .... These are referred to as "intimate associa-
tion" cases. 29 The boundaries of intimate association typically encompass family
affairs including marriage, child bearing and rearing, and cohabitation with rela-
tives.30 This freedom, however, is not restricted to family relationships; rather, it
also includes those relationships that presuppose "deep attachments and com-
mitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares ...
distinctively personal aspects of one's life.",31 "In another set of decisions, the
Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment ...., These are described as "ex-
pressive association" cases.33 Generally, the Court has not given the freedom of
expressive association a broad construction. Rather, its scope has been limited to
"a right to join with others to pursue goals independently protected by the first
amendment.,
34
Just as the government is not absolutely barred from impairing the free-
dom of speech and other First Amendment rights, it is also not absolutely for-
bidden from impairing the freedom of association.35 However, because associa-
tional freedom is a "fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of
,,36Rights, any state statute that more than an incidentally infringes on this fun-
25 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26 Id. at 460.
27 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
28 Id. at 617-18.
29 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18).
30 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
31 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
32 Id. at 618.
33 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618).
34 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-26, at 1013 (2d ed. 1988).
35 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
36 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
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damental right will be strictly scrutinized.37 In order for a state to enact laws that
interfere with protected associational activity, it must show that it is pursuing a
compelling objective, "unrelated to the suppression of ideas," that cannot be
achieved by any "means significantly less restrictive of associational free-
doms. 38 One governmental interest that has almost always been found to be
compelling is the elimination of discrimination based on race, sex, or other tra-
ditionally suspect criteria.39 For example, the Supreme Court has held that a
state could constitutionally require the Jaycees to admit women members, de-
spite an incidental infringement on the group's freedom of association.
40
Accordant with the right to associate, the Court has also recognized a
right not to associate, which implies that an organization has a First Amendment
interest in not being forced to accept unwanted members.41 In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Court stated, 'There can be no clearer example of an intru-
sion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire. ... Freedom of associa-
tion therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. 42
IV. A CRITIQUE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE
In a recent freedom of association case, James Dale challenged BSA's
policy of excluding avowed homosexuals after the organization revoked Dale's
membership upon learning of his openly gay status. 43 Having lost at the state
level,"n BSA appealed the Dale decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that
the LAD, as applied, violated its First Amendment rights.45 In fact, BSA made
37 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
38 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
39 See id. at 623-26.
40 See id. See also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (holding that California could constitutionally
force the Rotary Clubs in that state to admit women).
41 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
42 Id. Accord Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 122 (1981) (stating that part of the freedom of association is "the freedom to identify the
people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only").
43 See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204-05 (N.J. 1999) (discussing Dale's
exemplary twelve years in BSA, during which time he earned many of Boy Scouts's highest
honors and leadership positions, and was ultimately approved as an Assistant Scoutmaster),
rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). BSA revoked Dale's membership in 1990 when it discovered that
Dale was a co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. Id.
4 See Dale, 734 A.2d 1196.
45 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The New Jersey Supreme Court's
determination that BSA was subject to its state's LAD was final and binding on the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Baker, supra note 13, at 361-62. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's review was
limited only to the First Amendment issues. See id.
[Vol. 104
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three arguments invoking three separate aspects of the First Amendment. At the
core of all three arguments was the Boy Scouts's contention that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the system of values that it seeks to instill in young
boys.46 First, BSA made a freedom of speech claim, arguing that the adult troop
leaders are agents of the Boy Scouts, and that "BSA speaks directly and sym-
bolically through them and their leadership. 47 Second, BSA argued that it is an
"expressive association," and therefore its membership and leadership policies
are protected aspects of the First Amendment right of expressive association.48
Third, BSA argued that the personal bonds and close relationships between
scouts and their leaders qualify for protection under the freedom of "intimate
association., 49 Even though local Boy Scout troops appear to foster "close inter-
personal and mentoring relationships that seem worthy of consideration" in the
context of freedom of intimate association,50 the state courts quickly dismissed
BSA's intimate association claim. 5' The reasons for the courts' dismissals of
this claim were best summarized by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
stated that "[a]s applied to Boy Scouts, we find that its large size, nonselectivity,
inclusive rather than exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing
nonmembers to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not 'suffi-
ciently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection' under the free-
dom of intimate association." 52 Giving its implicit approval to the lower court's
findings, the Supreme Court did not even consider BSA's intimate association
claim.53 Therefore, the scope of this note is confined to a consideration of the
freedom of speech and freedom of expressive association issues.
A. Dale's Analogy to Freedom of Speech Jurisprudence
In Dale, the United States Supreme Court held that New Jersey's LAD,
as applied to require BSA to retain James Dale as a member, violated BSA's
46 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
47 Baker, supra note 13, at 362.
48 See id. See also Dale, 734 A.2d at 1223-24.
49 See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221-22.
50 Recent Case, Civil Rights-Public Accommodation Statutes-New Jersey Supreme Court
Holds That Boy Scouts May Not Deny Membership to Homosexuals, 113 HARV. L. REV. 621,
624 (1999).
51 Compare Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(stating that "Freedom of intimate association is not implicated here"), with Dale, 734 A.2d at
1222 (holding that "Boy Scouts has not demonstrated a protectable intimate association right
under the First Amendment").
52 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1221 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
53 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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First Amendment right of expressive association. 54 The majority opinion, au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, indicates the inter-relatedness of expressive
association and freedom of speech. Indeed, both the Court's holding and its en-
tire analysis are phrased only in terms of expressive association; nonetheless, the
body of the opinion ends with the following statement: "[T]he law.. . is not free
to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved mes-
sage or discouraging a disfavored one ... The Dale opinion thus demon-
strates the close nexus between expressive association and speech-both convey
a message or a set of ideas.56 The distinction is this: the textual freedom of
speech provided in the First Amendment is pure speech, or speech per se, while
freedom of expressive association is speech or expression via association. 57 The
substantive and practical impacts of the connection between these two doctrines
will become apparent in the discussion that follows.
B. The Roberts Trilogy
A trilogy of modem Supreme Court cases established a framework for
deciding Dale. The leading case is Roberts v. United States Jaycees.5 8 The Jay-
cees, a traditionally all-male organization designed to promote the civic interests
of its members, brought an action arguing that the application of Minnesota's
public accommodations law requiring the organization to admit women mem-
bers violated the group's First Amendment freedom of association.59 The Court
acknowledged that the right to expressive association is "especially important in
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression
from suppression by the majority. ' 60 A government action may unconstitution-
ally violate a group's right of expressive association by intruding into a group's
internal affairs and forcing it to accept a member it does not desire. 6' However,
"the freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute.,
62
54 See id. at 644.
55 Id. at 661 (emphasis added). Additionally, Justice Stevens states in his dissent that "[t]he
majority holds that New Jersey's law violates BSA's right to associate and its right to free
speech." Id. at 664.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27, 32-34.
57 Indeed, the act of joining a particular organization often sends a message. For example, if
one were to join PETA, one would be expressing the message that he or she supports the hu-
mane treatment of animals, while membership in the NRA sends a message advocating one's
Second Amendment right to bear arms.
58 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
59 Id. The Jaycees tried to invoke the right to both intimate and expressive association in
defending its exclusion of women. See id.
60 Id. at 622.
61 See id. at 623.
62 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
[Vol. 104
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Rather, that freedom can be overridden "by regulations adopted to serve com-
pelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational free-
doms. 63 Rejecting the Jaycees' argument, the Roberts Court thus held that
Minnesota could constitutionally require the Jaycees to admit women members,
even though there may have been some impairment of existing members' free-
dom of association or freedom of speech. 64 Minnesota's desire to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in places of public accommodation was a compel-
ling interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas. 65 The Court further found that
the State's law was the least restrictive means of achieving that goal.66 In short,
the Minnesota statute did not "impose[] any serious burdens" '67 on the Jaycees'
"collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals. '68
The Roberts Court thus provided the basic legal framework applicable
to freedom of association cases. Under Roberts, a state law that infringes upon
associational freedoms must pass a three-part strict scrutiny test: the law or
regulation must (1) serve a compelling state interest (2) that is unrelated to the
suppression of ideas (3) that cannot be achieved by any less restrictive means.
69
In applying this test, a court must ascertain the "shared goals" for which a given
group is organized and then inquire as to whether the law being challenged im-
poses any "serious burdens" on the group's ability to achieve those goals.7°
Two subsequent cases followed the Roberts framework. In Board of Di-
rectors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court again con-
sidered a freedom of association challenge to a state anti-discrimination stat-
ute.7 1 When a local Rotary Club chapter admitted women in compliance with
California's anti-discrimination law, its charter was revoked by Rotary Interna-
tional.72 The local chapter and its female members challenged the national or-
ganization's exclusionary policy under the California statute.73 Rotary Interna-
tional, a non-profit business and professional organization, argued that, under
the First Amendment, it had protected intimate association interests in maintain-
63 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 623-26.
66 Id. at 626-28.
67 Id. at 622.
68 Id. at 626.
69 See id. at 623.
70 Id. at 622, 626.
71 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
72 See id. at 541. Under Rotary International's constitution, women were excluded from
membership. Id.
73 See id. at 541-42.
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ing an all-male "fellowship" and selecting its members, as well as a right "to
associate for the purpose of engaging in protected speech. 74 The Court first
held that because of Rotary International's otherwise open and inclusive mem-
bership policies (inclusive of everyone but women), the relationships among the
clubs' members were not "sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitu-
tional protection" under the freedom of intimate association. 75 As in Roberts, the
Court also rejected the expressive association claim, concluding that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs would not "affect in any significant way" the clubs'
ability to carry out their "basic goals of humanitarian service [and] high ethical
standards in all vocations. 76 Although Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of ac-
tivities that are protected by the First Amendment, the California statute "does
not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities. 77 Moreover,
Rotary would not be required to abandon its fundamental membership criteria.
78
To be sure, whatever slight infringement the California statute worked on the
Rotary members' right of expressive association, "that infringement is justified
because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women. 79
So, in following Roberts, the Rotary Court added another set of inquir-
ies to a proper strict-scrutiny analysis in a freedom of association case. As in
Roberts, the Rotary Court inquired as to whether the application of the chal-
lenged state anti-discrimination statute would significantly affect the group's
ability to carry out its basic, shared goals. 80 Additionally, the Court questioned
whether the application of the law would require the group to "abandon or alter"
either its activities or its fundamental membership criteria.81 Answering each of
these questions in the negative leads the Court to conclude that the law is the
least restrictive means of serving a compelling state interest that is unrelated to
the suppression of ideas.
The final case in the Roberts trilogy is New York State Club Ass'n, Inc.
v. City of New York.8 2 Applying the three-part strict scrutiny analysis of Roberts
by way of those inquiries set forth in both Roberts and Rotary, the Court re-
jected a challenge to the constitutionality of a New York City law forbidding
discrimination by clubs with more than 400 members, finding that the law did
74 Id. at 541,544.
75 Id. at 546-47.
76 Id. at 548.
77 ld.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 549.
80 See id. at 548.
81 See id.
82 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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not require the club "to abandon or alter" any activities protected by the First
Amendment.83 The Court held that forced membership is unconstitutional if the
presence of an unwanted person affects in a significant way the group's ability
to advocate public or private viewpoints. 84 Thus, in order to prevail on a free-
dom of association claim, the group must "be able to show that it is organized
for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its de-
sired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership. 85
To summarize the precedent set by the Roberts trilogy, the Supreme
Court made it clear that state laws that infringe on constitutional rights of asso-
ciation would be strictly scrutinized. However, it seems equally apparent that
the Court would generally defer to states' interests in prohibiting discrimination
in places of public accommodation. To be sure, the Court struck down chal-
lenges to all three of the anti-discrimination statutes at issue in the Roberts tril-
ogy cases. However, as the ensuing discussion of the Dale decision demon-
strates, the Court does not believe that the prevention of all forms of discrimina-
tion rises to the level of a compelling state interest and, therefore, certain anti-
discrimination laws will be found to have been unconstitutionally applied.
C. The Dale Majority's Application of Roberts
Beginning with the premise that the freedom of expressive association is
not absolute, 86 the Supreme Court applied the framework from the Roberts tril-
ogy in the form of a three-part test to determine whether the Boy Scouts had a
protected expressive association interest in excluding James Dale.87 The first
part of the test is that the group must actually engage in "expressive associa-
tion., 88 This element is fairly easy to meet-the group must only engage in
"some form of expression, whether it be public or private., 89 The Court con-
cluded that the Boy Scouts's general mission to instill values in young people is
indisputably an expressive activity. 90 Because BSA engaged in expressive ac-
83 Id. at 13 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548). The state law provided that an organiza-
tion with more than 400 members could not avoid being classified as a "public accommoda-
tion" by claiming to be a "private" club. Id. at 5-6.
84 Id. at 13-14.
85 Id. at 13.
86 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
87 See 530 U.S. 640.
88 Id. at 648.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 649. The majority looked to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, which stated that protected expression may "take the form of ... inculcation of
traditional values, [and] instruction of the young .... Even the training of outdoor survival
skills or participation in community service might become expressive when the activity is in-
tended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement." 468
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tivities, those activities were presumptively entitled to protection under the First
Amendment.
For the second part of the test, the Court asked "whether the forced in-
clusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy
Scouts' [sic] ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." 9' Here, the Court
gave deference to BSA's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, as
well as BSA's view of what would impair that expression.92 "It is not the role of
the courts to reject a group's expressed values because they disagree with those
values or find them internally inconsistent., 93 Thus, the Court accepted BSA's
assertions that it teaches that homosexual conduct is immoral and that Dale's
status as a gay rights activist would interfere with BSA's expression.94
In a departure from the reasoning followed by the lower courts, 95 the
Supreme Court then applied Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, Inc.9 6 Hurley involved a gay and lesbian group that was
refused a place in a St. Patrick's Day parade organized by a Boston Veteran's
Council.97 The state court admitted the group into the parade, holding that the
parade was a public accommodation under Massachusetts law and that mandat-
ing inclusion of the group did not infringe upon the Council's right of expres-
sive association. 98 In reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the Coun-
cil's freedom of speech and reasoned that in a parade, the message of the private
organizers is shaped by all those who participate in the parade.99 Thus, the ap-
plication of the Massachusetts law violated the "autonomy [of the speaker] to
U.S. 609, 636 (1984).
91 Dale, 530 U.S. at 650 (emphasis added). See also New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (holding that forced membership is unconstitutional if
the person's presence affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate its view-
points).
92 Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-52.
93 Id. at 651 (citing Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 124 (1981) ("[A]s is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts
may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irra-
tional.")). Moreover, "a State, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment
for that of the Party." La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24.
94 Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-52.
95 See infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
96 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
97 See id. at 561. The parade organizers did not object to simply allowing gays and lesbians
to march in the parade-the fight was about whether the gays should be allowed to march in
their own unit under their own banner. See id. at 570, 572.
98 See id. at 561-63.
99 See id. at 572-73. The Court felt that forcing the inclusion of the gay group would, in
effect, be forcing the parade organizers to send a message supporting gay rights-a message
that they had a right to refuse to endorse. Id. at 574-75.
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choose the content of his own message."'l In the Dale case, both of the New
Jersey appellate courts below had distinguished Hurley from Dale, reasoning
that Hurley was a "pure speech" case, whereas Dale was an expressive associa-
tion case. 10' Indeed, in the lower state appellate decision, the court pointed out
that, unlike Hurley, Dale did not involve "pure forms of speech," or a plaintiff
who was "asserting a right ... to alter the content of the [organization's] view-
point." 10 2 The Supreme Court of New Jersey reaffirmed this analysis by stating:
We find the facts of Hurley distinguishable. Dale's status as a
scout leader is not equivalent to a group marching in a parade.
... Nor is Boy Scout leadership a form of "pure speech" akin to
a parade .... We reject the notion that Dale's presence in the
organization is symbolic of Boy Scouts' endorsement of homo-
sexuality. 
103
Rejecting the lower courts' distinction between Hurley and Dale, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Dale's presence in Boy Scouts "would, at
the very least, force the organization to send a message ... that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.' ' 1°4 Therefore,
BSA met the second element of the Roberts test, because the forced inclusion of
Dale would significantly affect BSA's right to refuse to support gay rights and
lifestyles. 0 5 The Court's finding that the application of the LAD had a signifi-
cant effect on BSA's protected First Amendment rights triggered the Court's
strict scrutiny analysis of the New Jersey statute.
Moving to the third part of the Roberts test, the Court asked whether the
application of New Jersey's LAD to require the Boy Scouts to retain Dale as an
Assistant Scoutmaster violated the Scouts's freedom of expressive associa-
tion. 1°6 This inquiry entailed a balancing test in which "the associational interest
in freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State's
interest on the other."'0 7 In evaluating these competing interests, the Court re-
jected Dale's argument advocating the application of the same intermediate
100 Id. at 573.
101 See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
102 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff'd,
734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
103 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999) (discussing Hurley, 515
U.S. at 557), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
104 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
105 See id. at 655-56.
106 See id. at 656. It should be emphasized here that the Court evaluated the LAD as applied,
rather than assessing the constitutionality of the statute on its face.
107 Id. at 658-59.
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standard of review used in United States v. O'Brien.'0 8 Comparing O'Brien to
Dale, the Court distinguished the two because "[a] law prohibiting the destruc-
tion of draft cards only incidentally affects the free speech rights of those who
happen to use a violation of that law as a symbol of protest."" 9 On the other
hand, "New Jersey's public accommodations law directly and immediately af-
fects associational rights .... Thus, O'Brien is inapplicable."' 10 Again, because
New Jersey's LAD had more than an incidental effect on BSA's First Amend-
ment rights, the LAD was subject to strict scrutiny, rather than a lower, interme-
diate level of scrutiny.
With very little analysis, the Court again compared Dale to Hurley, and
determined that "[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accom-
modations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' [sic]
rights to freedom of expressive association.""' It took the Court only one brief
paragraph to conclude that the LAD so significantly burdened BSA's First
Amendment "right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct" that that right far
outweighed any state interest in eliminating discrimination against homosexu-
als. 12 In other words, the Court believed that the State of New Jersey did not
have a compelling state interest in protecting gays from discrimination and, as a
result, the LAD's application to the Boy Scouts failed the strict scrutiny test. In
an apparent effort to justify its meager analysis on this point, the Court men-
tioned in a footnote that "[w]e anticipated this result in Hurley when we...
liken[ed] the parade to a private membership organization. .... [which] 'could
exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken
by the club's existing members.""' 13 Thus, the Court held that "the First
Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement through the
application of its public accommodations law."
'"14
D. The Dale Majority's Reliance on Hurley
The Supreme Court's reliance on Hurley in reaching its decision in Dale
is most significant. Despite the fact that the Court applied the Roberts frame-
work in formulating a three-part test for expressive association cases, the Court
did not reach the result that the Roberts trilogy would predict. Indeed, Justice
108 See id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The O'Brien Court used a four-part test to
review a law that prohibited the destruction of draft cards. See 391 U.S. at 376-77.
109 Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
110 Id. (emphasis added).
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 659 n.4 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995)).
114 Id. at 659.
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Stevens pointed out the error in the majority's reasoning by stating:
Several principles are made perfectly clear by [Roberts] and Ro-
tary Club. First, to prevail on a claim of expressive association
in the face of a state's antidiscrimination law, it is not enough
simply to engage in some kind of expressive activity .... Sec-
ond, it is not enough to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary
membership policy.... Third, it is not sufficient merely to ar-
ticulate some connection between the group's expressive activi-
ties and its exclusionary policy. 11
5
Accordingly, the proper test from the Roberts trilogy, according to Jus-
tice Stevens, is whether the state law at issue "imposes any serious burden" on
an organization's "collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals."' 1 6 Relying
on considerable factual support from the record, Stevens argued that "[t]he no-
tion that an organization of [BSA's] size and enormous prestige implicitly en-
dorses the views that each of those adults [(leaders)] may express in a non-
Scouting context is simply mind boggling."' 17 The majority, however, disagreed
with both Stevens and the courts below," 8 and found the facts of Dale analo-
gous to Hurley. Without its application of Hurley, the Court could not have con-
cluded that parts two and three of the Roberts test were met. Indeed, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade
would have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to
propound a particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy
Scout's [sic] choice not to propound a point of view contrary to
its beliefs." 9
Thus, applying the same "traditional First Amendment analysis" as in
Hurley, the Court was able to conclude that New Jersey's LAD violated the First
Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts. 20 The Court's error in relying upon Hur-
ley will become evident in the following discussion.
1 21
115 Id. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 683 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626 (1984)).
117 Id. at 697.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
119 Dale, 530 U.S. at 654.
120 Id. at 659. See also supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 188-97.
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E. Justice Stevens's Dissent
The majority opinion in Dale was countered with a vigorous dissent by
Justice Stevens. 22 Stevens began with the premise that federal courts should not
deter states from experimenting in "things social"123-that is, states should be
free to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social ... experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.' 24 New Jersey, in amending its LAD to include ho-
mosexuals as a protected class, was one of these "courageous" states, 125 and,
according to Stevens, it is not the proper role of federal courts to deter such ex-
perimentation. 26 Justice Stevens then argued that the majority got it wrong-
that the Roberts test was met (and, therefore, the LAD did not abridge the Boy
Scouts's constitutional rights) because New Jersey's LAD did not "impose any
serious burdens" on BSA's "collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals,"'
27
nor did it force BSA to send a message that it did not wish to endorse.1
28
Looking at the facts of the case, Stevens pointed out that it was quite
clear that Dale's more than twelve years of membership in BSA were nothing
less than exemplary. 2 9 In fact, he attained the rank of Eagle Scout, an honor
awarded to only the top three percent of all scouts, and was ultimately chosen to
be an Assistant Scoutmaster.1 30 Only after the Boy Scouts found out that Dale
had "come out of the closet" while away at college did the organization revoke
his membership.1
3 1
In its defense of Dale's suit, BSA argued that it teaches young boys that
homosexuality is immoral; therefore, forcing BSA to accept members who vio-
late this "shared" value of scouting would abridge the group's constitutional
right to associate. 32 On this point, Stevens's opinion radically diverged from
122 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 663-700. Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined in Justice
Stevens's dissent.
123 Id. at 664.




127 Id. at 664-65 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626 (1984)).
128 Id. at 665.
129 See id.
130 Id.
131 See id. See also Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204-05 (N.J. 1999), rev'd,
530 U.S. 640 (2000). Dale was understandably shocked by his expulsion-not only had the
Scouts bestowed numerous honors and awards upon Dale, but had even held him in such high
esteem that he was chosen to attend national events and other organized Boy Scouts functions,
where he spoke on behalf of BSA. Id.
132 Dale, 530 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that of the majority. The majority gave absolute deference to BSA's assertions
regarding the nature of its values (and, accordingly, the nature of its expression),
as well as to BSA's beliefs about what would impair the expression of those
values. 33 Stevens, on the other hand, closely examined the facts on record to
determine exactly what values BSA actually teaches.134 The record indicated
that the purposes for which BSA was organized were to instill values in young
boys by teaching patriotism, courage, and self-reliance. 135 The Boy Scouts
prided itself on having a "representative membership."'' 36 In fact, it emphasized
that "neither the charter nor the bylaws ... permits the exclusion of any boy."'
137
Nevertheless, despite the all-inclusive nature of the Scouts, the group argued
that a limiting factor placed upon membership eligibility was acceptance and
adherence to the "Scout Oath" and "Scout Law."'
138
Within its seemingly innocent Oath and Law, BSA found two key terms
upon which it hung its entire case-that boys who join BSA agree to be "mor-
ally straight" and to keep themselves "clean."'' 39 Justice Stevens examined the
history of these terms by looking at the definitions provided in the Boy Scout
Handbook.140 Therein, "morally straight" is defined as having "strong charac-
ter," and being guided by "honesty, purity, and justice."'' 4' Moreover, "morally
straight" means that a scout will "[riespect and defend the rights of all people,"
be "honest and open," and have the "courage" to do what he thinks is right, as
well as to "refuse to do what his heart and head say is wrong."' 42 As for the term
"clean," the Handbook instructs boys that they are not to use words as "weapons
that ridicule"143-that a scout always acts with "kindness [and] honor" in word
133 See id. at 653-55. See also supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
134 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




139 Id. at 667.
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id at 668. The specific language in the Handbook is particularly relevant here:
Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that ridicule other people
and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs and jokes making fun of
ethnic groups or people with physical or mental limitations. A Scout knows
there is no kindness or honor in such mean-spirited behavior.
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and deed, and "defends those who are targets of insults."144 Stevens concluded
that "[i]t is plain as the light of day" that neither of these principles said any-
thing about homosexuality. 145 To be sure, BSA's published guidance on the sub-
ject of sexual matters instructed boys to go to their parents, teachers, or religious
leaders for those sorts of questions. 146 The Scoutmasters were, literally, the last
individuals that the boys were encouraged to ask, and those leaders were told
that they were not to instruct scouts in the subject of sex because "it is not con-
strued to be Scouting's proper area."' 147 So far, it appeared to Justice Stevens that
the Boy Scouts had no shared values or "common moral stance on homosexual-
ity.
,,148
But, indeed, there were even more factual nails for Stevens to pound
into BSA's argumentative coffin. BSA had promulgated a position statement in
1978 that was circulated only among the members of the national Executive
Committee. 149 This statement stated that homosexuality was not considered "ap-
propriate" in Scouting, and that BSA would not knowingly employ any gays;
150
however, if there was ever a law passed prohibiting discrimination against ho-
mosexuals (as in New Jersey's LAD, for example), BSA would comply with
that law.'5 ' Stevens pointed to four aspects of this policy statement to counter
BSA's argument that homophobia was a value shared among its millions of
members.15 2 First, the statement simply adopted an exclusionary membership
policy, which "has never been considered sufficient, by itself, to prevail on a
right to associate claim.' 53 Second, the policy was never publicly expressed-
BSA secretly maintained an exclusionary membership policy while its out-
wardly-expressed public policy remained one of tolerance and acceptance.
154
Third, BSA's position assumed that membership in its group was a privilege;
however, because the New Jersey Supreme Court found that Boy Scouts was a
"public accommodation" under that state's LAD, membership in the multi-
144 Id. (emphasis added).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 669-70.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 672.
150 Id.
151 See id. Compliance with such a law would be consistent with a scout's duty to be
"obedient" and "obey the laws," even if he thinks they are unfair. Id. at 672-73.
152 See id. at 672.
153 Id.
154 Id. Stevens remarked that "[i]n this respect, BSA's claim [of expressive association] is
even weaker than those we have rejected in the past." Id.
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million member Scouts was a right. 5  Finally, the statement simply said that
homosexuality was not "appropriate," without making any "effort to connect
that statement to a shared goal or expressive activity of the Boy Scouts.,"
' 56
Justice Stevens criticized the majority's erroneous reliance on four other
policy statements promulgated by BSA, all of which were written and issued
after the organization revoked Dale's membership. 157 The post-hoc nature of
these statements negated their legal relevance. 158 Moreover, the statements were
inconsistent, and therefore did not meet Stevens's test that "[a]t a minimum, a
group seeking to prevail over an antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear
and unequivocal view."'' 59 As a result, Stevens found "BSA's inability to make
its position clear and its failure to connect its alleged policy to its expressive
activities" fatal to BSA's claim of expressive association.1
6
Moving on to attack the majority opinion on legal grounds, Justice Ste-
vens began by stating that the right to associate does not mean an unequivocal
right to discriminate in the selection of associates.' 6' After giving examples of
other cases in which the Court had rejected assertions of this right by organiza-
tions with discriminatory membership policies, 162 Stevens pointed out that the
Court has "never once found a claimed right to associate in the selection of
members to prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law."' 63 In fact,
"invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
155 See id. at 672-73. Here, Stevens suggested that the "appropriate way for BSA to preserve
its unpublished exclusionary policy would include an open and forthright attempt to seek an
amendment of New Jersey's statute." Id. at 673. This would be consistent with scouting's
tenet that "[i]f he [(a scout)] thinks these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them
changed in an orderly manner rather than disobey them." Id.
156 Id. "Whatever values BSA seeks to instill in Scouts, the idea that homosexuality is not
Iappropriate' appears entirely unconnected to, and is mentioned nowhere in, the myriad of
publicly declared values and creeds of the BSA." Id.
157 See id. James Dale's membership was revoked in 1990, and he brought suit in 1992. See
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1205 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). In
the meantime, BSA promulgated four position statements in the years 1991-93, largely in re-
sponse to pending or anticipated litigation. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 673-74; Dale, 734 A.2d at
1205 n.4.
158 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 676. The statements were contradictory in that those issued in 1991-92 stated that
homosexuality was inconsistent with the Scout requirement that boys be "morally straight" and
"clean." Id. In 1993, however, BSA abandoned that attempt to link its policy to its central
tenets; instead, it adopted the position that its members preferred to exclude homosexuals be-
cause they could not be proper role models. See id. at 676-77.
160 Id. at 677.
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freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections."'
' 64
Then, after examining the precedent set by the Roberts trilogy of cases,
Stevens argued that the majority was also wrong in its application of the Roberts
rule. 165 According to Stevens, Roberts set three limitations on a group's ability
to prevail on a claim of expressive association in contravention of a state's anti-
discrimination law: (1) "it is not enough simply to engage in some kind of ex-
pressive activity;" (2) "it is not enough to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary
membership policy;" and (3) "it is not sufficient merely to articulate some con-
nection between the group's expressive activities and its exclusionary policy."166
Thus, the test from Roberts is whether the state law "'imposed any serious bur-
dens' on the group's 'collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals." 1
67
Applying the Roberts test to the facts of Dale, Stevens concluded that
BSA "has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality," not to mention
that such a view (if it existed) was never taught to scouts. 168 Moreover, BSA
never adopted a clear position on homosexuality.1 69 Thus, New Jersey's LAD
could not impose any "serious burden" upon the "shared goals" of BSA "if the
group itself is unable to identify its own stance with any clarity."'
' 70
It is crucial to point out that the majority opinion avoided the entire
foregoing analysis because it simply deferred to BSA's assertions, made during
litigation, that homophobia was not only a shared value among its millions of
members, but that it was also a core expressive purpose for which the Boy
Scouts was formed. 171 Additionally, the Court deferred to BSA's assertion that
James Dale's mere presence in Boy Scouts would impair that expression.
172
According to the majority, "[lt is not the role of the courts to reject a group's
164 Id. at 679 n.1 1 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984)).
165 See id. at 678-81.
166 Id. at 682-83.
167 Id. at 683 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 626 (1984)).
Here, the Court should properly inquire as to whether compliance with the state law would
significantly affect protected speech, or require the group to abandon its basic goals. See id.
(citations omitted). Moreover, the group must show that it was organized for specific expres-
sive purposes, and that the group's expression of its views is dependent upon confining its
membership (and excluding certain classes of people). See id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)).
168 Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
169 See id. at 685.
170 Id.
171 See id. at 685-86. The majority believed that so long as the record contained "written
evidence" to support BSA's bare assertion, it "need not inquire further" because the Court
"cannot doubt" the truth of that assertion. Id. at 651-53.
172 See id. at 653.
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expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent."'' 73 However, Stevens argued, rightly so, that courts are to do just
that when internally inconsistent views are used to bolster a claim of freedom of
association in direct contravention of a state's antidiscrimination law. 174 As for
the Court's duty to give deference to the Boy Scouts's assertions, Stevens pro-
pounded:
This is an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any pre-
vious instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitu-
tional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts
in his or her brief and inquiring no further. It is even more as-
tonishing in the First Amendment area, because, as the majority
itself acknowledges, "we are obligated to independently review
the factual record." It is an odd form of independent review that
consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims. 
75
The majority's form of "independent review" blurs the line between le-
gitimate exercises of the right to associate and "sham claims that are simply
attempts to insulate nonexpressive private discrimination.' 76 Affording litigants
such as the Boy Scouts a shield from judicial scrutiny poses a serious risk of
rendering anti-discrimination legislation a nullity. 77 In short, the majority of the
Court in Dale made a grievous error in failing to conduct a truly independent
inquiry, and has "turn[ed] the right to associate into a free pass out of antidis-
crimination laws."'
178
As for BSA's First Amendment freedom of speech claim, Justice Ste-
vens acknowledged that BSA has a right to exclude messages about homosexu-
173 Id. at 651.
174 See id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argued:
An organization can adopt the message of its choice, and it is not this Court's
place to disagree with it. But we must inquire whether the group is, in fact, ex-
pressing a message ... and whether that message .. . is significantly affected by
a State's antidiscrimination law. More critically, that inquiry requires our inde-
pendent analysis, rather than deference to a group's litigating posture.
Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 687.
177 See id. at 687-88. Justice Stevens quoted from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Ry.
Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945): "Certainly the insistence by individuals on their
private prejudices ... ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination
of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself
exacts." Dale, 530 U.S. at 687.
178 Dale, 530 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ality from the values that it teaches to scouts. 179 Moreover, James Dale's right to
advocate his beliefs in public or private forums does not include a right to advo-
cate those ideas when he is working as a Scoutmaster. 80 But BSA's right to
choose "what not to say" goes to free speech, and not to the right to associate.18'
Thus, BSA can choose not to speak to its scouts on the subject of homosexual-
ity, but it cannot exclude James Dale from membership in the organization
based solely on his status as a homosexual unless it can prove that Dale would
advocate homosexuality while working for BSA or otherwise act in such a way
to use his position in BSA to force the Scouts to proclaim a message it did not
wish to send.'
82
Although the majority in Dale did not endorse the argument, BSA be-
lieved that Dale would use his position as a bully pulpit to advocate his views on
homosexuality, and therefore his inclusion would force BSA to send an "im-
moral" message to its scouts. 18 3 The simple fact is that BSA had no proof that
Dale had, or ever would, do such a thing. 84 All Scoutmasters were instructed
that sexual issues were not their "proper area," and there was "no evidence that
Dale had any intention of violating this rule."' 85 If he did not comply with the
rule, then BSA could rightfully revoke his membership. 186 There was no basis to
assume that a homosexual could not comply with BSA's policies.
187
The majority did, however, accept BSA's argument that Dale's mere
presence in BSA would force the Scouts to convey a message about homosexu-
ality. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied solely on Hurley, which, ac-
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. The right to choose "what not to say" comes from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). The Hurley Court
explicitly pointed out the distinction between free speech and right to associate claims. See 515
U.S. at 564-65, 580-81.
182 BSA itself conceded that its rights were "not implicated unless a prospective leader
presents himself as a role model inconsistent with Boy Scouting's understanding of the Scout
Oath and Law." Dale, 530 U.S. at 691-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
183 See id. at 692.
1s4 See id. at 689-93.
1s5 Id. at 690.
186 Id. at 691. Stevens pointed out that BSA "relies on compliance with its policies and trusts
Scouts and Scoutmasters alike not to bring unwanted views into the organization. Of course, a
disobedient member who flouts BSA's policy may be expelled." Id.
187 See id. Justice Stevens argued that a heterosexual who was not homophobic could just as
well speak out on his views of acceptance and tolerance as pertaining to homosexuals. See id.
at 691 n.19.
188 See id. at 692. The majority held that the presence of an avowed homosexual in an
Assistant Scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinct message "that the Boy Scouts accepts homo-
sexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior;" accordingly, BSA was entitled to exclude that
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cording to Justice Stevens, was erroneous for several reasons.189 First, the parade
at issue in Hurley was an "inherently expressive undertaking," and the gay
group's participation in the parade "'would likely be perceived' as the parade
organizers' own speech--or at least as a view which they approved-because of
a parade organizer's customary control over who marches in the parade."' 90 Sec-
ond, Dale's inclusion in BSA was nothing like the case in Hurley because "[h]is
participation sends no cognizable message."191 Stevens argued that Dale's "mere
act of joining the Boy Scouts ... does not constitute an instance of symbolic
speech under the First Amendment."
192
Indeed, if merely joining a group did constitute symbolic
speech; and such speech were attributable to the group being
joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and
hence, the right to exclude that person from joining), then the
right of free speech effectively becomes a limitless right to ex-
clude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any
expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the
law. 1
93
Essentially, the majority seemed to believe, as did BSA, that James Dale's gay
status amounted to a permanently affixed "homosexual" label-a label that
"even though unseen, communicates a message that permits his exclusion wher-
ever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostra-
cism.'
194
A third difference between Dale and Hurley is that Hurley involved the
parade organizers' right to determine the content of their message at a particular
time and place.195 A claim of expressive association, on the other hand, "nor-
mally involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position on some issue
over time," and therefore receives a different kind of scrutiny. 196 Finally, Justice
Stevens found that the notion that an organization that has welcomed over 87
message. Id. at 692-93.
189 See id. at 693-94.
190 Id. at 693.
191 Id. at 694. "Unlike GLIB [(the gay group in Hurley)], Dale did not carry a banner or sign
... and he expressed no intent to send any message." Id. at 695.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 695.
194 Id. at 696 (emphasis added). Stevens continued: "Though unintended, reliance on such a
justification is tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority." Id. The
counsel for Boy Scouts even stated at oral argument that Dale "put a banner around his neck
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million members endorses the views of each individual in the organization is
"simply mind boggling."' 97
Though Justice Stevens attacked the majority's decision on many
grounds, the bottom line, as reiterated in Justice Souter's separate dissent, was
simple: the Boy Scouts failed to make out an expressive association claim "not
because of what BSA may espouse, but because of its failure to make sexual
orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it cus-
tomarily employs to state its message."' 98 According to Justice Souter, to require
less than a clear and unequivocal position advocated over time "would convert
the right of expressive association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination
law."'199
V. THE PRECEDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DALE
Dale is a landmark in a newly emerging line of constitutional jurispru-
dence. The cases in which the Court has considered homosexuality within the
context of the Constitution are few-the two most notable are Bowers v. Hard-
wick2°° and Romer v. Evans.2 °' So, what effect will Dale have on the future de-
velopment of this area of the law? The precedent set by Dale will likely be felt
on three fronts.
A. The Court's Refusal to Recognize the Elimination of Homophobic
Discrimination as a Compelling State Interest
The most significant precedent set by Dale is that the Court refused to
find that the elimination of invidious discrimination against homosexuals may
be a compelling state interest. Because the Court found that New Jersey's LAD
had a direct and immediate effect on BSA's protected right of association under
202
the First Amendment, the state law was subject to strict scrutiny. As a prece-
dent, this means that states cannot defend their public accommodations laws
197 Id. at 697.
198 Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 701-02.
200 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, a state statute making sodomy illegal was held to be
constitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment did not create a fundamental right to engage
in sodomy, even if consensual, and even if done in the privacy of one's own home. Id.
201 517 U.S. 620 (1996). There, a state passed a constitutional amendment which prohibited
the legislature or any other governmental unit within the state from enacting laws designed to
protect homosexuals from discrimination. See id. at 623-24. The Supreme Court held that the
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the classifi-
cation based on sexual orientation was found to be unrelated to any legitimate state interest.
See id. at 632.
202 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. See also supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
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against constitutional challenges by claiming that protecting persons from in-
vidious discrimination because of their sexual orientation is a compelling state
interest.20 3 A private organization's First Amendment freedoms, in particular
that of expressive association, can be overridden only if a state can demonstrate
a compelling state interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved by any other less restrictive means.204 This is an extremely high hurdle,
and one that states are unlikely to overcome in their attempts to protect homo-
sexuals from discrimination, so long as the Court is unwilling to recognize that
states may have a compelling interest in enacting laws that would protect gays
from the devastating effects of hatred for the sake of hatred. The result is that
private organizations now seem to have an "easy trump" of anti-discrimination
laws:20 5 the Supreme Court has, in effect, created a "constitutional shield" for
invidious discrimination against gays.2°
B. The Effect of Dale on Public Accommodations Laws
A second effect of the precedent set by Dale is that states will no doubt
question the efficacy of broadening the scope of their public accommodations
laws to include traditionally non-suspect classes. After all, what is the benefit of
enacting a law that cannot be applied in order to accomplish its purpose? "At
least nine States, the District of Columbia [and] 74 cities ... have enacted laws
that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations. 2 7
A ruling allowing an organization of [BSA's] scope and with
this level of engagement with government to discriminate will
severely compromise the ability of the State to enforce its civil
rights laws in contexts involving the protection of not just sex-
ual orientation, but every class of our most vulnerable citi-
zens.
208
203 Contrast sexual orientation with race and gender, classifications which receive heightened
protections. A state does have a compelling interest in protecting persons within those classifi-
cations from invidious discrimination. Of course, the argument is that race and gender are
immutable characteristics, while sexual orientation is not. Or is it? An examination of this
question exceeds the scope of this note; however, it is probable that the members of the major-
ity in Dale believe that sexual orientation is not an immutable characteristic. See Dale, 530
U.S. at 656 n.2.
204 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
205 Dale, 530 U.S. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 Brief of the American Bar Association as Anmicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699).
208 Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey in Support of Respondent at 1, Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699).
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The result of these concerns will be that states which would have otherwise cho-
sen to amend their public accommodations laws to prohibit discrimination
against homosexuals may not do so in light of Dale.
209
C. Dale as an Impediment to Desirable Social Change
Dale only "symbolizes the latest legal battleground in what Justice An-
tonin Scalia once called the Kulturkampf that is being waged in the larger soci-
ety over homosexual rights., 210 Past experience tells us that changes in social
thinking often spark changes in legal thinking. Perhaps it can be argued that it is
fitting that the Court would wait, and take its cue from society at large, for the
proper time to acknowledge the common humanity shared by all Americans,
including homosexuals. However, there have been occasions when the Court
was brave enough to provide the impetus for social change, such as in the land-
mark case of Brown v. Board of Education,21 1 which was met with enormous
resistance in the racially-divided South. Judges, just like ordinary citizens, find
comfort in the status quo. Change comes slowly, and often only after overcom-
ing great opposition. Sexual orientation is no exception to the rule. It is true that
society is gradually coming to accept homosexuality as a "legitimate form of
behavior" 212 as young generations are taught the values of diversity and accep-
tance.213 In response, many states have taken action to protect gays from the
harms caused by homophobic discrimination. It remains to be seen how long the
Court will wait to acknowledge that homosexuals are the targets of invidious
discrimination, and therefore deserve the protections that more and more states
see fit to provide. Regardless of which side you are on, this controversial issue
will continue to be played out on all fronts-societal, political, and judicial.
209 Of course, not all "public accommodations" can show either a protected expressive
association purpose or an intimate association right, which means that not all such organiza-
tions would have valid grounds for challenging a state's public accommodations law.
210 Baker, supra note 13, at 364 (referring to Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 636 (1996), in which he described the battle being waged in society over homosexual
rights as a Kulturkampf, German for "culture war").
211 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212 Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000). Of course, whether being gay is properly called a
"behavior" is the subject of much debate, and exceeds the scope of this note. Suffice it to say
that the majority in Dale would likely classify homosexuality as a behavioral "choice," while
the dissenters would probably argue that sexual orientation has more biological foundations.
213 As a continuing sign of homophobic intolerance by "older" generations, consider the
Defense of Marriage Act, passed in 1996. The Act provides that "[n]o State ... shall be re-
quired to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . .
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2001).
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF DALE
So, what is the future of Dale? In a word: precarious. The Court's deci-
sion in this case was 5-4, with a dissent by Justice Stevens that was both vigor-
ous and persuasive.214 Given that two Justices on the current Court, namely Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, have a tendency to be the "swing" votes, it is pos-
sible that they could be persuaded to join the side of the "liberal minority" when
they are again confronted with the issue of discrimination against homosexu-
als.215 It is also foreseeable that a shift in the composition of the Supreme Court
in the coming years will result in a more liberal majority that may overrule the
Dale decision, as has happened in the past with such decisions as Plessy v. Fer-
216 217guson1 6 and Goesaert v. Cleary. Moreover, the tide of social change will
only make the idea of civil rights for homosexuals more socially acceptable, as
it did with African-Americans and women before. As Justice Stevens observed,
"[I]nteraction with real people [over time], rather than mere adherence to tradi-
tional ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes" has a tendency to
modify the prevailing social opinion.21 8 The courts tend to respond in kind to the
changing social tide, even if they do so slowly or reluctantly. Finally, the high
number of amici curiae briefs in this case indicate that myriad groups are con-
cerned about and have a stake in this issue.219 This concem is due to the ongoing
prevalence of prejudice against gays, which continues to cause "serious and
214 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 663-700.
215 It is generally acknowledged that Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and
Thomas are the "conservative" members of the Court. They are often, but not always, joined
by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsberg tend to
compose the "liberal minority." It was Justice Kennedy who wrote the opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which, taken in light of his position in Dale, is some evidence that
he may be torn on this issue. Perhaps Kennedy might be persuaded that counter-homophobic
legislation serves at least an important enough purpose to off-balance a weakly-based intimate
association claim or an expressive association claim where homophobic expression is at best a
weak part of a group's expressive purposes. Of course, in Dale, he must have concurred in the
majority's finding that anti-homosexual propaganda was an important part of BSA's expressive
purposes, a claim that Justice Stevens found preposterous.
216 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine was later overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
217 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (applying "mere rationality" review to a classification based on
gender). Goesaert was later explicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (formulating a new "intermediate" level of scrutiny for gender-based clas-
sifications).
218 Dale, 530 U.S. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219 Over thirty amici briefs were submitted to the Court in this case. Those groups support-
ing BSA were primarily religious, pro-family, and legal groups. Curiae supporting Dale in-
cluded cities, states, and school districts, the ACLU, NAACP, and other civil rights groups, and
the ABA and other legal organizations.
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tangible harm" to countless homosexuals. 220 "That harm can only be aggravated
by the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of
a habitual way of thinking about strangers." 221 Indeed, when this question is
again presented to the Court, Justice Brandeis's prudent advice may finally be
heeded: "[W]e must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal
principles. 222
Erica L Stringer"
220 Dale, 530 U.S. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221 Id.
222 Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
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